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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ROBERT GLEN ZAZWETA,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 43646
Bannock County Case No.
CR-2009-15056

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Issue
Has Zazweta failed to show error in the district court’s denial of his motion for
credit for time served?

Zazweta Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Denial Of His Motion For
Credit For Time Served
While on parole for a 1998 Bonneville County case, Zazweta pled guilty to
possession of marijuana with intent to deliver in this 2009 Bannock County case and the
district court imposed a unified sentence of five years, with three years fixed, and
retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.101-06, 226.) “At about the same time, the parole board,
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in the 1998 Bonneville County case, revoked Zazweta’s parole and incarcerated him in
prison,” resulting in Zazweta completing his period of retained jurisdiction in this case “in
the yard while in prison.” (R., pp.226-27.) Zazweta filed a timely Rule 35 motion for a
reduction of sentence, which the district court granted in part, ordering that Zazweta’s
sentence in this case run concurrently with his sentence in the Bonneville County case.
(R., pp.121-22, 124-31.)
On August 30, 2010, following the period of retained jurisdiction in this case, the
district court suspended Zazweta’s sentence and placed him on probation for five years.
(R., pp.4, 132-398.) However, Zazweta remained incarcerated in prison for the 1998
Bonneville County case until March 26, 2012, when he “topped his time in prison in the
1998 case and left prison while still on probation in this case.” (R., pp.227-28.)
Zazweta subsequently violated his probation in this case, and the district court
revoked his probation and ordered the underlying sentence executed. (R., pp.168-74.)
Zazweta subsequently filed motions for credit for time served. (R., pp.196-202, 215-16.)
The district court awarded Zazweta 319 days of credit for time served in the Bannock
County jail for this case, but denied him credit for the time he served in prison for the
Bonneville County case while he was on probation in this case.

(R., pp.226-32.)

Zazweta filed a notice of appeal timely only from the district court’s Decision on Motion
for Credit for Time Served. (R., pp.233-35.)
“Mindful of Idaho law,” and “the fact that Idaho’s statutes do not provide for an
award of credit in this circumstance,” Zazweta nevertheless asserts that the district
court erred by denying his motion for credit for the time he served in prison for the
Bonneville County case while he was on probation in this case. (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-
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6.) Zazweta has failed to show error in the district court’s denial of his motion for credit
for time served with respect to the time he served in prison for an unrelated case while
he was on probation in this case.
Idaho Code § 18-309 provides:
(1) In computing the term of imprisonment, the person against
whom the judgment was entered shall receive credit in the judgment for
any period of incarceration prior to entry of judgment, if such incarceration
was for the offense or an included offense for which the judgment was
entered. The remainder of the term commences upon the pronouncement
of sentence and if thereafter, during such term, the defendant by any legal
means is temporarily released from such imprisonment and subsequently
returned thereto, the time during which he was at large must not be
computed as part of such term.
(2) In computing the term of imprisonment when judgment has
been withheld and is later entered or sentence has been suspended and
is later imposed, the person against whom the judgment is entered or
imposed shall receive credit in the judgment for any period of incarceration
served as a condition of probation under the original withheld or
suspended judgment.
I.C. § 18-309 (emphasis added).
On appeal, Zazweta acknowledges that the incarceration for which he seeks
credit (the time he served in prison for the Bonneville County case while he was on
probation in this case) “did not occur prior to his entry of a guilty plea, thus triggering
I.C. S 18-309(1).” (Appellant’s brief, p.5.) Nor was Zazweta’s incarceration in prison for
the Bonneville County case “for the offense or an included offense for which the
judgment [in this case] entered.” I.C. § 18-309. Zazweta further acknowledges that the
incarceration for which he seeks credit “was not served as a condition of his probation
or after service of an arrest warrant for an alleged probation violation, thus triggering
I.C. § 18-309(2) or I.C. § 19-2603.” (Appellant’s brief, p.5.) Pursuant to I.C. § 19-2603,
when the court revokes probation upon finding a violation:
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The defendant shall receive credit for time served from the date of service
of a bench warrant issued by the court after a finding of probable cause to
believe the defendant has violated a condition of probation, for any time
served following an arrest of the defendant pursuant to section 20-227,
Idaho Code, and for any time served as a condition of probation under the
withheld judgment or suspended sentence.
The district court correctly noted, in its order on Zazweta’s motion for credit for time
served:
The time Zazweta spent in prison on his Bonneville County case
while on probation on his Bannock County case does not fall under either
of the above statutes. He was not in prison for the Bannock County
offense or any included offense for which judgment was entered so I.C. §
18-309 does not apply. He was not in prison on any bench warrant in the
Bannock County case so I.C. § 19-2503 [sic] does not apply.
… Instead, he was simultaneously serving a prison sentence in the
Bonneville County case while serving probation in the Bannock County
case.
(R., pp.230-31.) The district court did not err in refusing to give Zazweta credit for the
time he served in prison on a separate Bonneville County case during the period of time
he was on probation (and was not serving time as a condition of probation, nor had he
been arrested for an alleged probation violation) in this case.
Zazweta has failed to establish error in the district court’s denial of his motion for
credit for time served. The district court’s Decision on Motion for Credit for Time Served
should therefore be affirmed.

4

Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s order
denying Zazweta’s motion for credit for time served.

DATED this 16th day of March, 2016.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming___________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

VICTORIA RUTLEDGE
Paralegal
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JENNY C. SWINFORD
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming___________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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